Turkey and the European Union: An Association in the Making by Archiyan, Yelena E.
TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN 
ASSOCIATION IN THE MAKING 
Yelena E. Archiyan1 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 117 
I.   THE BASICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ............................................... 119 
A. Background ................................................................................. 119 
B. Accession .................................................................................... 121 
II.  TURKEY’S NON-CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IMPEDING ACCESSION ...... 122 
A. Geography ................................................................................... 122 
B. The Cyprus Dispute .................................................................... 123 
C. Aegean Sea Dispute .................................................................... 125 
1. Conclusions on Turkey’s Disputes with Greece over 
    Cyprus and the Aegean Sea ................................................ 126 
D. Denial of Armenian Genocide .................................................... 128 
E.  Satisfying the Copenhagen Economic Criteria ........................... 129 
F.  Acquis Communautaire .............................................................. 133 
III. LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS .......................................................................... 136 
A. Constitutional Provisions ............................................................ 137 
B. Other Laws and Their Use Against the Kurds ............................ 140 
1. Conclusion .......................................................................... 143 
IV. A COMPARISON WITH OTHER RECENTLY JOINED EU MEMBERS: 
    BULGARIA AND ROMANIA ................................................................... 144 
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 147 
 
INTRODUCTION 
What began as a six country regional governmental organization has 
become, since 1951, a dominant coalition, representing twenty-seven 
nations across almost all of Europe.2  A candidate since 1987, Turkey has 
had a long history with, and played a large role in, Europe through its 
membership in various European organizations since the late 1940s.3  
Examples of such organizations include the Organization for Economic Co-
  
 1. Michigan State University College of Law, J.D. expected 2012; Aquinas College, 
B.S. in International Business 2008. 
 2. See The History of the European Union: Animated Map, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/abc/history/animated_map/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 3. See European Commission: Enlargement, EU-Turkey Relations, EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2011) [hereinafter EU-Turkey Relations].   
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operation and Development (OECD), Council of Europe, Western European 
Union, and most notably, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).4  
Turkey and the EU formed a partnership in 1963 upon the signing of the 
Ankara Agreement,5  which formally allowed for the commencement of 
negotiations for full membership.6  Although accession negotiations began 
in October of 2005,7  the EU has been reluctant to admit Turkey, citing the 
need for, among other things, fulfilling the requirements of the Copenhagen 
criteria,8 enhancing human rights, resolving border disputes, recognizing the 
Armenian Genocide, and improving its citizens’ political freedoms.9  
Negotiations began six years ago, and the EU has yet to admit Turkey.10  
While there are many barriers standing in Turkey’s way, this article will 
primarily focus on the major ones.  It will argue that while Turkey has made 
substantial progress in its domestic affairs, economic policies, and some 
progress in improving relations with its neighbors, Turkey requires 
additional reforms.  The first part of this paper will provide background 
information on the EU, including its history and the accession process.  The 
second part will address major obstacles relating to Turkey’s geography, 
international disputes, and human rights issues.  The third part will analyze 
the government’s constitutional provisions in the context of its modern 
internal affairs, and demonstrate that while certain rights are explicitly 
enumerated in Turkey’s latest Constitution, they do not extend beyond the 
text of that Constitution.  In practice, few such rights exist, and in 
application, few are effective.  The final part will compare and contrast 
  
 4. See Members and Partners, OECD,  
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761800_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2011); 47 Countries, One Europe, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=47pays1europe&l=en (last visited Oct. 12, 
2011); List of 28 Delegations, WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, http://weu.int/ (last visited Nov. 
17, 2011); NATO Member Countries, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-BAFED586-
DD86353C/natolive/nato_countries.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011).   
 5. EU-Turkey Relations, supra note 3.   
 6. These types of association agreements are not uncommon.  They prepare a 
candidate country for full membership and approximate the EU legislation.  “[T]hey are 
agreements with extended trade liberalization between the EU and the country associated.”  
They “entail stronger economic and political ties between the two parties.”  Email from 
Europe Direct to Yelena Archiyan (Mar. 24, 2011, 7:13:59 EST) (on file with author). 
 7. EU-Turkey Relations, supra note 3; Europe in 12 Lessons, Enlargement and 
Neighbourhood Policy, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_3/index_en.htm (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy]. 
 8. Syntheses de la legislation, Glossary: Accession Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria), 
EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_ 
en.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Accession Criteria]. 
 9. See EC, Turkey 2010 Progress Report Accompanying the Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, at 35, COM (2010) 660 (Nov. 
9, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/ 
tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Progress Report]. 
 10. EU-Turkey Relations, supra note 3.   
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Turkey’s negotiation process with the processes of EU’s two newest 
members: Bulgaria and Romania.   
I. THE BASICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
A. Background  
Kofi Annan once said, “No nation needs to face or fight alone the threats 
which this organization was established to diffuse.”11  Even though he was 
referring to the United Nations, the European Union has a similar purpose; 
it merely accomplishes this goal on a regional level.  States with similar 
characteristics integrate to form regional coalitions so they can “better 
address world problems.”12  In 1951, six European nations integrated to 
form the European Coal and Steel Community whose purpose was to reduce 
nationalism and promote peace.13  The European Coal and Steel Community 
became the European Economic Community.14  The purpose of this 
transformation and expansion was to integrate economically and 
politically.15  Having a united Europe with similar goals also prevents any 
one European country from becoming a regional hegemon, as was the case 
before the 1950s.  Of course, the key success of the EU has been its ability 
to keep peace in Europe.16  The European Economic Community became 
the “European Union” in 1992 upon the signing of the Treaty of 
Maastricht.17   
It was not until 1973 that other European countries began joining the EU, 
and accession continues to this day.  While theoretically all members of the 
EU are equal, in reality the most populous member-nations have the most 
power.  This is so because they have the most votes in the Council of the 
EU, which is responsible for “defin[ing] [EU’s] general political direction 
  
 11. JOHN ROURKE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON THE WORLD STAGE 190 (10th ed. 
2005).   
 12. Id. at 191.   
 13. See The History of the European Union, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/abc/history/1945-1959/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Not only has there been no outbreak of war in Europe since the EU’s creation, 
but for the first time in European history, there has been a transfer of sovereignty from 
individual nation-states to a collective organization.  The creation of the EU is significant for 
another reason—no longer is the modern nation-state a complete model of political 
organization.  The EU’s other accomplishments, and why they reflect Turkey’s desire to join, 
include Europe’s economic strength, the opportunity to enter new markets, the potential for 
adopting the euro, and being part of a “functioning institutional framework.” Hans N. Weiler, 
The EU at a Crossroads: The Tension Between Expansion and Integration 5-6 (2004) 
(transcribed lecture notes), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~weiler/ERT1_ 
manuscript.pdf. 
 17. History of the European Union, supra note 13. 
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and priorities.”18  Today, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy 
are the most influential in policy-making because they have the most 
votes.19   
Most recently, Bulgaria and Romania were admitted as members.  
Whereas they applied for admission in 1995, Turkey has been aspiring to 
join since 1987, and only in 1999 did the Helsinki European Council decide 
to upgrade Turkey to “candidate country status.”20  A country is granted this 
status when the EU Council officially accepts its application for 
membership.21  Official talks began at the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, at 
which time the European Commission said that the EU could conclude 
negotiations with Turkey only after 2014.22   
The EU’s most current Progress Report23 revealed the enlargement 
strategies and main challenges facing Turkey’s membership for the 2010-11 
year.  The Commission stated that Turkey sufficiently satisfies the political 
criteria,24 but much work still remains with respect to human rights,25 
freedom of the press,26 and the Kurdish question.27  With respect to 
democracy and the rule of law, the Commission noted that “Turkey still 
needs to align its legislation as regards procedure and grounds for closures 
of political parties with European standards.”28  With respect to Turkey’s 
regional issues and international obligations, the Cyprus and Greek 
questions still need work.  On a positive note, the Commission noted that 
Turkey is successfully meeting the EU’s economic criteria, even though the 
nation suffered a series of financial crises beginning shortly after the turn of 
the century.29   
  
 18. The European Council-An Official Institution of the EU, EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 
http://www.european-council.europa.eu/the-institution.aspx?lang=en (last visited Dec. 1, 
2011). 
 19. See Council of the European Union, Voting Calculator, CONSILIUM, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/council/voting-calculator.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2011). 
 20. PASCAL FONTAINE, EUROPE IN 12 LESSONS 13 (2004), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/eu_glance/22/en.pdf [hereinafter Fontaine]; see also 
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, supra note 7.  
 21. European Commission Enlargement, Glossary, Candidate Countries, EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/glossary/terms/candidate-countries_en.htm (last visited Nov. 
17, 2011). 
 22. Turkey’s Quest for EU Membership, EU CTR. OF N.C., EU BRIEFINGS, Mar. 2008, 
at 2, 5, available at, http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/business_media/mediabriefs/Brief4_ 
Turkey%27s_quest_web.pdf. 
 23. See generally 2010 Progress Report, supra note 9. 
 24. See id. at 6-16. 
 25. Id. at 17. 
 26. Id. at 21. 
 27. See id. at 35.   
 28. Id. at 7.  
 29. See generally 2010 Progress Report, supra note 9.   
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B. Accession  
Article forty-nine of the Treaty on European Union defines the process 
of accession.30  A nation is eligible for accession if it complies with the 
EU’s principles, which are enumerated in Article Two.31  Article forty-nine 
further provides that the candidate nation must submit an “application to the 
Council, which must act unanimously.”32  Before the Council takes a vote, it 
consults with the Commission and the Parliament, “which shall act by a 
majority of its component members.”33  Finally, “[t]he conditions of 
admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is 
founded . . . shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member 
States and the applicant State.”34  The contracting states must ratify this 
agreement “in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements.”35   
An aspiring country must meet three qualifications known as the 
Copenhagen Criteria:  first, the country must be democratic, which means 
that there must be a presence of human rights and freedoms, respect for the 
nation’s minority population(s), and the rule of law; second, the country 
must meet the economic requirement (it must have a free market system); 
finally, the aspiring nation must be able to adhere to the entire EU law 
(acquis communautaire)36 which consists of over 80,000 pages of 
legislation.37 The acquis communautaire includes: (1) “the content, 
principles and political objectives of the treaties”; (2) “legislation adopted 
pursuant to the Treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice”; (3) 
“declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union”; (4) “instruments under 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy”; (5) “instruments under Justice 
and Home Affairs”; and (6) “international agreements concluded by the 
Community and those entered into by the Member States among themselves 
within the sphere of the Union’s activities.”38 
Notwithstanding the above requirements, not one EU member-state that 
joined “had complied fully with the acquis at the time of . . . entry.”39  All 
entering countries were provided a transitional period.40  The EU cautions 
  
 30. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 49, Mar. 10, 
2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 43 [hereinafter TEU].   
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Accession Criteria, supra note 8.   
 37. FONTAINE, supra note 20, at 12.    
 38. European Commission Enlargement, Glossary, Acquis, EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/glossary/terms/acquis_en.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 39. HARUN ARIKAN, TURKEY AND THE EU: AN AWKWARD CANDIDATE FOR EU 
MEMBERSHIP 34 (2003). 
 40. Id. 
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nations that avoidance of compliance “cannot go against the nature and 
spirit of the acquis”; “it can only be put in place in order to guarantee that 
the ultimate principle of full applicability of the acquis communautaire to 
the new outermost regions stemming from Article 299(1) EC is 
respected.”41  While it was made clear that the enlargement of 2007 would 
require applicants to accept the acquis communautaire before accession, it 
is even clearer that was not the case.  Consider, for example, Bulgaria: upon 
its accession, the EU believed that Bulgaria had made efforts to adjust its 
legislation and administration to make them conform to the laws and rules 
of the EU.  Nevertheless, the EU said that “[s]ustained support from the 
European Union will be available for addressing the remaining issues.42  
This suggests that, in theory, Turkey need not satisfy all chapters of the 
acquis before it will be offered membership.  But the question of whether 
the EU will require Turkey to satisfy all chapters so as to delay admission 
for as long as possible, which is what it seems to have been doing since 
2005, remains to be seen.     
II. TURKEY’S NON-CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IMPEDING ACCESSION  
A. Geography  
As its name suggests, the European Union is located in Europe.  
According to the Treaty on European Union, only “European States” may 
apply for membership.43  Although the Treaty does not define what a 
“European State” is, currently all but one EU member are located on the 
European continent.44  According to the current physical structure of the 
EU, it became evident that “the line in the South was drawn to the 
Mediterranean” when the EU rejected Morocco’s application in 1987 on the 
grounds that the country is not in Europe even though it is Spain’s neighbor 
to the south.45  The defining border to the west is naturally the Atlantic 
  
 41. Dimitry Kochenov, Substantive and Procedural Issues in the Application of 
European Law in the Overseas Possessions of the European Union Member States, 17 MICH. 
ST. J. INT’L L. 195, 280 (2009). 
 42. European Commission Enlargement, Bulgaria—EU-Bulgaria Relations, 
EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/bulgaria/eu_bulgaria_relations_en.htm 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 43. TEU art. 49. 
 44. Cyprus is officially located in the Middle East. CIA, Cyprus, WORLD FACTBOOK , 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html (last visited Nov. 
17, 2011). Malta, while situated in the Mediterranean Sea, is officially located in Southern 
Europe. CIA, Malta, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/mt.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 45. EUR. COMM’N, GOOD TO KNOW ABOUT EU ENLARGEMENT 10 (2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/publication/screen_mythfacts_a5_en.pdf. 
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Ocean.46  To the north, the EU’s border is between Finland and Norway.47  
The problem is stretching to the east.  While the Black Sea is a natural 
border to the east, Bulgaria and Romania, both of which border the Black 
Sea, are already members.  In theory, the EU could stretch to the 
Caucuses,48 but it was explicit that to go as far as Russia “would create 
unacceptable imbalances.”49   
Officially, Turkey is located in Southeastern Europe and Southwestern 
Asia.  Only the minuscule portion of Turkey that lies to the West of the 
Bosporus is located in Europe.  The capital of Turkey, Ankara, is located in 
Asia, and a great majority of Turkey’s population lives on the Asian 
continent.50  Its neighbor to the northwest is Bulgaria and to the south is 
Cyprus, both of which are EU members.51   
The implications associated with admitting Turkey, a mostly non-
European nation, into the EU would be significant.  What precedent will be 
set if Turkey becomes a member?  Will Syria, Lebanon, and Israel want to 
join, making the argument that they too border the Mediterranean Sea?  The 
end result is this: however far the EU decides to expand, its expansion 
endeavors must be cautious to maintain effective and democratic 
functionality.52  
B. The Cyprus Dispute 
In its latest Progress Report on Turkey, the EU Commission noted that 
Turkey needs to improve its bilateral relations with Cyprus.53  In fact, in 
2006 the EU put a hold on the opening of negotiations of eight chapters of 
the acquis because of Turkey’s restriction on the “free movement of goods 
carried by vessels and aircraft registered in Cyprus or whose last port of call 
was in Cyprus.”54  This means that in the nearly impossible event that 
Turkey meets the other chapters before it lifts its restrictions, it will be 
  
 46. Press Release, Europe’s Next Frontiers, Mr. Olli Rehn’s Lecture at the Finnish 
Institute of International Affairs (Oct. 27, 2006), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/654&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Europe’s 
Next Frontiers]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, supra note 7. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Turkey Entry ‘Would Destroy EU,’ BBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2002), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2420697.stm (noting former French President Valery 
Giscard d’Estaing’s statement that ninety-five percent of Turkey’s population lives outside of 
Europe). 
 51. Dan Bilefsky, Romania and Bulgaria Join European Union, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/01/world/europe/01cnd-union.html?ex=1325307600 
&en=6b90297ac208df26&ei=5088. 
 52. Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, supra note 7. 
 53. 2010 Progress Report, supra note 9, at 36. 
 54. Id. at 47; see also EU-Turkey Relations, supra note 3. 
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unable to open negotiations with the EU on these eight chapters until the 
hold is removed.   
The dispute between Turkey and Greece over the Island of Cyprus began 
shortly after Cyprus gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960.55  
Guerilla warfare broke out on the island when Turks responded to the Greek 
movement called enosis (unification of Cyprus and Greece) through a 
process called takism (division of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey).56  
At the end of this revolutionary movement, Turkey came to control 38% of 
Cyprus’s territory.57  The Cypriot Government claims that what provoked 
Turkey’s reaction was the Cypriot government’s attempt to make changes to 
the Constitution, which was “unworkable.”58 
Cyprus is divided into two parts.  The parts are disconnected by the 
“Green Line,” which “separates the government-controlled areas from the 
rest of the island.”59  The portion that is occupied by Turkey is called the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and is highly dependent 
upon Turkey for its agriculture, tourism, and aid.60  Turkey’s occupation is 
viewed as illegal and is unrecognized internationally.61  Greece and its 
counterpart in Cyprus (Republic of Cyprus), and Turkey and its counterpart 
(TRNC) each have mutual defense agreements.   
Although the entire island of Cyprus was admitted into the European 
Union in 2004, only the free portion of the island adheres to the acquis 
communautaire of the European Union.62  In 2002, the United Nations took 
the initiative to reunite the people of Cyprus through the Annan Plan.63  The 
Annan Plan consisted of three stages: (1) “negotiations were to be held 
  
 55. A settlement was reached in 1959, but the London-Zurich agreements were 
signed in 1960 by Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Patricia Carley, U.S. Foreign Policy 
and the Future of Greek-Turkish Relations, in GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY: CYPRUS, THE AEGEAN, AND REGIONAL STABILITY 1, 2 (1997), available at 
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/pwks17.pdf. 
 56. Ali Kazancigil, The Cypriot Question, in TURKEY TODAY: A EUROPEAN 
COUNTRY? 173, 175 (Olivier Roy ed., 2004); see also COMM’N ON CYPRUS’ PROGRESS 
TOWARDS ACCESSION, REGULAR REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON CYPRUS’ PROGRESS 
TOWARDS ACCESSION 11 (1998), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/ 
key_documents/1998/cyprus_en.pdf. 
 57. Kazancigil, supra note 56, at 176. 
 58. Government Web Portal, CYPRUS, http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/portal/portal.nsf/ 
dmlgovernment_en/dmlgovernment_en?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 59. European Commission Enlargement, Turkish Cypriot Community, EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkish_cypriot_community/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 
17, 2011). 
 60. WILLIAM MALLINSON, PARTITION THROUGH FOREIGN AGGRESSION: THE CASE OF 
TURKEY IN CYPRUS 8 (2010).  
 61. Id. at 1.   
 62. Id. at 3.   
 63. Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, The Cyprus Conflict and the Annan Plan: Why One 
More Failure?, 5 EGE ACAD. REV. 29, 35 (2005), available at http://eab.ege.edu.tr/pdf/5/C5-
S1-2-M4.pdf (Turk.). See generally The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem 
(Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf. 
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between the two Cypriot communities under UN auspices”; (2) “a 
conference was to be organized in which the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, 
and Greece and Turkey were to take part”; and (3) “a referendum [was to 
have been] held on the plan in both communities.”64  The Annan Plan did 
not make it past stage three because Greek Cypriots voted 75.8% against it 
in the referendum.65  Although both sides were historically resistant to any 
peaceful resolution, Turkish Cypriots surprisingly voted 64.9% in favor of 
reunification in the referendum.66  Perhaps the reason the referendum was 
not approved by the Greek Cypriots is because all of their claims in the 
European Court of Human Rights would have to be withdrawn.67  In effect, 
the Plan would have denied Greek Cypriots their legal rights.68   
Cyprus’s accession on May 1, 2004 symbolized a serious impediment for 
Turkey.  Cyprus’s former President Tasos Papadopoulos69 “made it very 
clear that Cyprus as an EU member state would block any decision 
regarding Turkey’s EU membership[] until a solution for Cyprus had been 
reached on better terms for the Greek Cypriots than the Annan Plan.”70  
Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, all member states must 
ratify the accession agreement before a country may be admitted into the 
EU.71  The chances of Cyprus ratifying Turkey’s admission are slim and 
will likely remain that way until a cooperative agreement desirable for both 
sides, especially the Greek Cypriots, is reached.72   
C. Aegean Sea Dispute  
A similar dispute between Turkey and Greece involves the status of the 
Aegean Sea.  This dispute was discussed at the 48th Meeting of the EU-
Turkey Association Council in 2010.73  The dispute revolves around the 
question of who controls the territorial waters, the airspace, and the 
  
 64. ERIC FAUCOMPRET & JOZEF KONINGS, TURKISH ACCESSION TO THE EU: 
SATISFYING THE COPENHAGEN CRITERIA 177 (2008).    
 65. A. Marco Turk, The Negotiation Culture of Lengthy Peace Processes: Cyprus as 
an Example of Spoiling that Prevents a Final Solution, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
327, 330 (2009). 
 66. Id.   
 67. VAN COUFOUDAKIS, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 17 (2008)   
 68. Id.   
 69. Tasos Papadopoulos was succeeded by Dimitris Christofias in 2008.  Christofias 
Wins Cyprus Presidential Election, USA TODAY, Feb. 24, 2008, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-02-24-cyprus-elections_N.htm. 
 70. FAUCOMPRET & KONINGS, supra note 64, at 179.  
 71. TEU art. 49. 
 72. Turk, supra note 65.  
 73. See 48th Session of the Turkey-EC Association Council, UE-TR 4806/10, at 19 
(May 12, 2010) (statement by Mr. Ahmet Davuto lu & H.E. Mr. Egemen Ba i ), available 
at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st04/st04806.en10.pdf [hereinafter 48th 
Session of Turkey-EC Association Council]. 
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continental shelf.74  Greece’s position on this issue is that it should be able 
to extend its dominion over the Aegean Sea to the limit established by the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Seas (LOS), which says that “[e]very 
State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit 
not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in 
accordance with [the] Convention.”75  Currently, it only claims six nautical 
miles of the Sea.76  Furthermore, it argues that pursuant to LOS and the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, it should have the right 
to exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf up to two hundred 
nautical miles from its coastal and island baselines.77  Turkey, on the other 
hand, argues that “much of the Aegean seabed is . . . a prolongation of the 
Anatolian land mass that is part of Turkey.”78   
While actions in furtherance of normalizing  relations have been taken by 
both Greece and Turkey, including those involving international arbitration 
and cases taken to the International Court of Justice, improvements have 
been minimal.79  Several resolutions have been proposed, including a 
maritime joint development regime.  This would involve the parties 
themselves deciding the appropriate level of cooperation.  It has been 
suggested that a joint organizational structure for the exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources in the seabed should be established.  The 
absence of politics in the regime would also be beneficial.80  At the 2010 
meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council, the Council noted that 
Turkey is “ready to continue to work with Greece towards the settlement of 
[this issue] through peaceful means in accordance with international law.”81  
1. Conclusions on Turkey’s Disputes with Greece over Cyprus  
  and the Aegean Sea 
While it is understandable that Greece is using its presence in the EU in a 
self-interested fashion to keep out Turkey, a question arises: would it not 
  
 74. ARIKAN, supra note 39, at 150.    
 75. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, art. 3 
[hereinafter Law of the Sea].   
 76. Michael N. Schmitt, Aegean Angst: A Historical and Legal Analysis of the 
Greek-Turkish Dispute, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 15, 16 (1996).  It should be noted that 
the international standard for sea extension is three nautical miles.  Id. at 24.   
 77. Law of the Sea, supra note 75, art. 76(1) & (4).   
 78. Chip Arvantides, Disputing the Continental Shelf Region in the Aegean Sea: The 
Environmental Implications of the Greek--Turkish Standoff, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, 
http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/aegean.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 79. Yucel Acer, A Proposal for a Joint Maritime Development Regime in the Aegean 
Sea, 37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 49, 50 (2006).   
 80. Id. at 76.   
 81. 48th Session of Turkey-EC Association Council, supra note 73, at 19; see also 
Press Release 12353/09 (Presse 228), at 11, Council of the EU, 2957th Council Meeting, 
General Affairs and External Regulations (July 27, 2009), available at 
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benefit Greece to have Turkey as a member?  It is quite obvious that since 
1981 “Greece has pursued a policy, which implies that improvement in the 
EU-Turkey relations, and Turkey’s accession to the EU, should depend 
upon the settlement of disputes between Greece and Turkey.”82  But is 
Greece taking the correct approach?  Would it not make more sense for 
Greece to support Turkey’s accession and advance its policies of dispute 
resolution after Turkey becomes an EU member?  Turkey as an EU member 
would probably be an “easier neighbor to deal and live with than [one that 
is] alienated, fundamentalist and militaristic.”83  While Turkey may be 
reluctant to settle these international border disputes until all other issues are 
resolved and until it gains EU membership, there seems to be a paradox 
here—resolving these disputes amounts to a condition of membership, at 
least according to the EU’s annual progress reports on Turkey.84  On the 
other hand, Turkey has little incentive to do what the Commission 
recommends with respect to these issues because, from its perspective, the 
EU is reluctant to offer it full membership anyway, 85 so why should it 
concede first?  However, the EU has nothing to lose by not offering Turkey 
full membership.  In fact, several European leaders, most notably Nicolas 
Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, are against Turkish membership.86  Europe is 
  
 82. ARIKAN, supra note 39, at 47. 
 83. Bulen Aras, The Importance of Turkey to Relations Between Europe and the 
Turkic Republics of the Former Soviet Union, 2 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 91, 109 
(1997) (quoting Seyfi Tashan, A Turkish Perspective on Europe-Turkey Relations on the Eve 
of the IGC, 20 FOREIGN POL’Y (Ankara) 61-64 (1996)). 
 84. See 2010 Progress Report, supra note 9, at 37 (noting the requirement that 
Turkey “commit unequivocally to good neighbourly relations and to a peaceful settlement of 
disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter”). 
 85. See A Mediterranean Maelstrom, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/15065921?story_id=15065921;http://www.economist.com/
node/15065921?story_id=15065921; see also Stephen Kinzer, Turkey, Rejected, Will Freeze 
Ties to European Union, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/15/world/turkey-rejected-will-freeze-ties-to-european-
union.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all; Turkey Warns EU Becoming ‘Christian Club,’ 
EUBUSINESS (Jan. 30, 2011), http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/davos-economy-
meet.8d9.  
 86. See David Charter, Leave Turkey’s Bid to Join EU to Us, Nicolas Sarkozy Warns 
Barack Obama, SUNDAY TIMES (London), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ 
news/world/europe/article6041404.ece; French President Sarkozy Visits Turkey, RIA 
NOVOSTI (Moscow) (Feb. 25, 2011), http://en.rian.ru/world/20110225/162749832.html. See 
also Patrick R. Hugg, Accession Aspirations Degenerate: A New Chapter for Turkey and the 
EU, 9 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 225, 236 (2010); Charlie Rose: A Conversation with 
French Interior Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy (PBS television broadcast July 13, 2007) 
[hereinafter Charlie Rose]; Craig Smith, European Union Formally Opens Talks on Turkey’s 
Joining, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/04/ 
international/europe/04turkey.html?_r=2&ex=1286078400&en=5190c31623f6ec33&ei=508
8&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; Bruno Waterfield, EU President Herman Van Rompuy Opposes 
Turkey Joining, TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 19, 2009, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/6600570/EU-president-Herman-
Van-Rompuy-opposes-Turkey-joining.html. 
128 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:1 
concerned about dealing with a country that is “too big, too poor, too 
undemocratic—as well as too Muslim and non-European.”87  So, would it 
not make the most logical sense that Turkey, rather than the EU, make 
amends in furtherance of EU membership?   
D. Denial of Armenian Genocide  
The EU Parliament has encouraged Turkey to recognize the Armenian 
Genocide.88  The Genocide took place in 1915 and resulted in the deaths of 
1,500,000 Armenians.89  While this act of genocide was committed by the 
Ottoman Turks and not the government in place today, the modern 
government still has an obligation to acknowledge what its predecessor did 
nearly a century ago.  The modern government stepped into power in the 
early 1920s when the Ottoman Empire was dissolved and a modern 
Republic of Turkey was created and recognized by the Treaty of 
Lausanne.90  A major difference between the Ottoman Turkish government 
and the modern Turkish government is secularism.  The new government 
transformed the nation into a secular state and instilled in it democratic 
practices.    
The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide defines genocide as:  
[A]ny of a number of acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group; killing members of 
the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.91    
The Armenian genocide meets this definition.92  In fact, many advanced, 
industrialized nations, as well as individuals, have recognized the Armenian 
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Genocide, 93 including Russia, Argentina, France, Greece, and even the 
Pope.94  Thus far, about twenty countries have recognized the 1915 
massacre as “genocide.”95  Turkey, in contrast, has historically denied and 
continues to deny what its predecessor government did ninety-six years 
ago.96  To be clear, Turkey’s primary argument is that there were no 
killings.  Alternatively, it argues that if killings occurred, they did not 
amount to genocide.97  However, there is unambiguous evidence along with 
academic scholarship proving that the massacre of more than 1,000,000 
Armenians took place.98   
On September 28, 2005, the European Parliament urged Turkey to 
recognize the Genocide.99  This took place around the time negotiations 
with Turkey began.  More recently, an amendment has been added to the 
2010 Progress Report on Turkey, which “[u]rges Turkey to ratify the 
protocols with Armenia, to open the border with this neighbor 
unconditionally and to acknowledge the genocide of Armenians, Greeks and 
Assyrians.”100  Turkey has its reasons for denying the genocide, two of 
which relate to its concern about how it will be perceived in the 
international community and to avoid giving Armenia back its territory.  
But if Turkey were to acknowledge the genocide, it is doubtful it would lose 
the respect of the international community.  Instead, recognition would most 
likely lead to cooperation between Turkey and Armenia, provide closure to 
both countries, and most importantly, bring Turkey one step closer to EU 
membership.   
E. Satisfying the Copenhagen Economic Criteria 
Under the Copenhagen standards, a candidate country must show two 
things to satisfy the economic criteria: (1) “existence of a functioning 
market economy; and (2) “capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the EU.”101  According to the 2010 Progress Report on 
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Turkey, the Commission concluded that Turkey has made adequate progress 
in this area.102   
In comparative terms, Turkey is doing no worse than Bulgaria and 
Romania when they were in the negotiation stages.103  Turkey has, however, 
along with the rest of the world, suffered from the recent economic crisis, 
which has delayed certain aspects of its economic progress.104  Turkey’s 
economic problems are addressed not by the EU, but by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.105   
To briefly summarize the EU Commission’s conclusions on the 
existence of a functioning market economy in Turkey, the 2010 Progress 
Report stated that the “consensus on economic policy essentials has been 
preserved” but “better planning, coordination and communication” would 
help boost the confidence in the “government’s economic policy.”106  In 
addition, the government’s privatization efforts have helped Turkey’s 
economy considerably.107 
With respect to the economy’s “capacity to cope with competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union,” the Commission in 2010 
gave Turkey mixed reviews.108  It stated that while Turkey is recovering 
from the economic crisis, the opportunities for structural reforms, due to the 
strong fundamental pillars that the government has been creating since 
1980, and low interest rates are available.109  It also stated that Turkey’s 
growth is delayed due to “high inactivity and insufficiently broad-based 
productivity growth.”110  It concluded, however, that the crisis did not 
negatively affect the market mechanism functions.111   
All this is relevant to Turkey’s accession because the EU wants member 
nations to be able to adjust to the EU economy, which obviously is much 
bigger than the economy of a single nation.  In doing so, it expects 
candidates to improve and align their economic policies with the policies of 
the EU so that its populace can compete with the citizens of the EU.  There 
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is an acquis chapter on this aspect called the Freedom of Movement of 
Workers.112  It takes into account, among other things, the educational 
system in a candidate country, literacy rates, and corruption levels.113  The 
Turkish government is participating in the EU’s education and youth 
programs to better prepare its young generation for competition in the 
workforce in the EU.114  Fifteen new universities were established in a 
period of one year.115  Turkey has also taken aggressive steps to fight 
corruption.  For example, it approved the Conventions of the European 
Council towards fighting against corruption.116  It also became a member of 
the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and ratified the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption.117  In 2009, it ranked 61st out of 180 
countries on the corruption scale, scoring 61 out of 100 points.118   
Some numeric factors, including GDP, inflation rates, income inequality, 
human development, unemployment, and foreign direct investment can 
show a lot about how a country is doing economically.  Eurostat, the official 
EU statistics database, compares countries’ GDP per capita relative to one 
another and relative to the EU itself whose average (accounting for all 27 
members) is set to one hundred.  Turkey received a score of 47 in 2008, the 
latest year for which GDP information for Turkey is available.119  Romania 
also received a score of 47, while Bulgaria got 43 points.120  Turkey’s 
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inflation rate was 8.6% in 2010, while Bulgaria’s was 3% and Romania’s 
was 6.1%.121  The inflation rate in Cyprus was 2.6% in 2010.122   
Income inequality is measured by the GINI index on a scale of one to 
one hundred, with one representing no inequality and one hundred 
representing the maximum amount of inequality.  Turkey and Romania 
received a score of 39.7 and 31.2 in 2008, respectively, while Bulgaria 
received a score of 45.3 in 2007, the latest year for which information for 
Bulgaria was available.123  The human development index measures the 
“level of human development of people in a society that accounts for 
inequality.”124  The 2010 report revealed that Turkey was in 83rd place while 
Bulgaria and Romania took 58th and 50th place, respectively.125  If Turkey 
were a member of the EU, it would rank last out of all current EU members.   
Turkey’s unemployment rate in 2010 was 12%, while Bulgaria’s was 
9.5%, and Romania’s was 6.9%.126  Foreign direct investment is also a 
useful measure of how strong a country’s economy is.  It is defined as “an 
investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside 
of the economy of the investor.”127  The EU Commission believed that 
Turkey’s ability to diversify its trading had an effect on alleviating the 
impact of the economic crisis.128  The United Nations Report indicated that 
as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, Turkey’s FDI inward flow 
in 2009 was 7.3%, while its outward flow was 1.5%.129  Comparatively, as a 
percentage of gross fixed capital formation, Bulgaria’s FDI inward flow in 
2009 was 38.3%, while its outward flow was -1.2%.130  Finally, Romania’s 
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FDI inward flow in 2009 was 15.3% of gross fixed capital formation, while 
its outward flow was at 0.5%.131   
The conclusions to be drawn from these numerical indicators are that 
Turkey, for the most part, is near the bottom in almost all categories relative 
to other EU member-states.  Nonetheless, the latest Progress Report 
indicated that Turkey is relatively well aligned with EU policies in meeting 
the economic criteria.132  The Commission also found that there was “strong 
economic interdependence between the EU and Turkey.”133  While the EU 
is impressed with some aspects of Turkey’s economy, it is awaiting more 
improvements in some specific areas.  For example, the government still 
needs to implement structural reforms, including investing in human capital 
and providing social benefits.  It should implement legislation to equalize 
the playing field for women so they can compete fairly with men for jobs.134  
Turkey also needs to attract more foreign direct investment.  To do so, it 
needs to modify its judicial system, manage its corruption, and develop its 
physical infrastructure.135  It is clear, however, that Turkey is much closer to 
meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria than it is to meeting the 
Copenhagen political criteria as well as satisfying the requirement to adhere 
to the entire EU law.   
F. Acquis Communautaire 
The third non-negotiable condition of EU accession is adherence to the 
acquis communautaire (the entire EU law).  The aspiring EU state must 
have the “ability to take on the obligations of full membership,” including 
the administrative, judicial, and legislative aspects of the EU law.136  The 
phrase has a broad definition and includes “all the real and potential rights 
and obligations of the EU system and its institutional framework.”137  For 
Turkey, this means supporting the “UN Secretary General’s effort to bring 
the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem to 
a successful conclusion.”138  Upon accession, this 80,000 page document 
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must be adopted and translated into the applicant country’s language.139  In 
Turkey’s case, only 20% of it has been translated.140   
The process of negotiations is as follows: First, the non-problematic 
chapters, such as Science and Research, are disposed of.141  Once a country 
aligns its policies with a certain chapter, the chapter is then presented to the 
Council for its adoption by a unanimous vote.142  If a chapter poses 
problems for a country, the country has the option to ask for “transitional 
measures, opt-outs and/or derogations.”143  In response, the Commission 
“would [create] a Draft Common Position (CP) for the EU and send [it] to 
the Council.”144  The Council will then engage in a screening process during 
which it will adopt a common negotiating document.145  The CP is then 
presented to the applicant state and, if it accepts, its acceptance “would be 
decided as an Article of Accession Treaty.”146  If it does not, the 
Commission and Council will modify the CP as many times as needed 
before the applicant state accepts its provisions.147  In the 2010 Progress 
Report on Turkey, the Commission addressed Turkey’s adherence to each 
of the 33 acquis chapters.148  A summary is presented below.    
 
Acquis Chapter Turkey’s Status on Alignment 
Free movement of goods Limited progress has been made; Turkey 
has not yet incorporated the requirements 
of the acquis  
Freedom of movement for workers Alignment is at an early stage 
Right of establishment and freedom to 
provide services 
Alignment is at an early stage 
Free movement of capital Some alignment has been made 
Public procurement Some aspects are in the advanced stage of 
alignment 
Company law Limited alignment  
Intellectual property law High level of alignment  
Competition policy  High level of alignment 
Financial Services  Some alignment has been made  
Information society and media Some alignment has been made 
Agriculture  Limited alignment  
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Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary  
policy  
Progress has been made, but further 
efforts are necessary  
Fisheries  Some alignment has been made 
Transport policy  Some alignment has been made with the 
exception of the railway sector 
Energy High level of alignment  
Taxation Some alignment has been made 
Economic and monetary union Some alignment has been made 
Statistics  High level of alignment  
Social policy and employment Some alignment has been made 
Enterprise and industrial policy  Sufficient level of alignment  
Trans-European networks  Sufficient to high level of alignment 
Regional policy and coordination of 
structural instruments  
Some alignment has been made 
Judiciary and fundamental rights  Alignment in certain areas of the judiciary 
have been made  
Justice, freedom, and security  Alignment is at an early stage with regard 
to migration; further efforts are needed 
with regard to external borders & 
Schengen; alignment is at an early stage 
with regard to judicial cooperation in 
criminal and civil matters; further efforts 
are needed with regard to police 
cooperation, customs cooperation, and the 
fight against drugs 
Science and research High, but incomplete level of alignment  
Education and culture  Good progress on education and culture, 
but lacking legislative alignment 
Environment  Limited alignment on horizontal 
legislation; limited alignment on air 
quality; high level of alignment on waste 
management; little alignment on water 
quality; no alignment on nature 
protection; limited alignment on industrial 
pollution control and risk management; 
limited alignment on chemicals and 
climate change; high level of alignment 
on noise;  
Consumer and health protection  Low alignment in the area of consumer 
protection; some alignment in the  area of 
public health  
Customs union High level of alignment in certain aspects  
External relations High, but incomplete level of alignment  
Foreign, security, and defense policy  Some alignment has been made 
Financial control Limited alignment 
Financial and budgetary provisions  Limited alignment149 
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From the foregoing, it appears that either Turkey has a long way to go 
before it can align its policies with all of these chapters, unless it can ask for 
a transitional measure or an opt-out, or that the Commission is intentionally 
raising its standards to delay Turkey’s accession. 
III. LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS   
Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty is procedural in nature and outside 
the control of a candidate country in that the decision whether to allow 
admission lies with the European Union Council, Parliament, and member-
states.  Furthermore, because the acquis communautaire is everything the 
EU did prior to a candidate’s accession, it, too, is outside the candidate’s 
control.  Because adopting the acquis is a condition of membership, a 
candidate has no other choice than to accept its substance.  The 
development and stability of a nation’s economy is also subject to external 
conditions.  However, the political criteria—the presence of human rights 
and freedoms, respect for a nation’s minority populations, and the rule of 
law—are all within the candidate country’s control,  and it is the country’s 
constitution that sets the foundation for these items.  Moreover, because it is 
in the government’s discretion to provide or take away these rights and 
freedoms, the political criteria should weigh more heavily.  Each country 
has its own unique facts; what may be standing in the way of one may not 
be an issue for another.  According to previous progress reports, Turkey has 
many deficiencies in this area.  Some issues cannot be resolved as easily as 
the government enacting a law, such as with Cyprus, the Aegean Sea 
dispute, or the functionality of a market economy.  The same is not true, 
however, when it comes to Turkey’s domestic policies and relations with its 
citizens.  In 2010, Turkey has demonstrated this is so:  Turkey’s legal 
system underwent major reforms when its Constitution was amended 
through a public referendum,150 the Law on Fundamental Principles of 
Elections and Electoral Rolls was amended to allow for language other than 
Turkish to be used in election campaigns,151 and a Kurdish department at a 
university was established.152  It appears that after five decades of being an 
applicant, Turkey is finally liberating itself from a longstanding history of 
archaic traditions and aligning itself with the political requirement of the 
Copenhagen criteria.153  This section will focus on the specific issues 
regarding Turkey’s constitutional and other legal reforms and their flaws.  
This is only one aspect of the Copenhagen political criteria; there are a total 
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of three requirements to satisfy the political criteria—democracy, rule of 
law, and respect for human rights and protection of minorities.154 
A. Constitutional Provisions 
Modern Turkey has had three constitutions: the 1924 Constitution; the 
1961 Constitution, which brought developments in the parliamentary 
system; and the 1982 Constitution, which remains in effect today.155  The 
1982 Constitution gave great powers to the executive156  and formed the 
basis of the Turkish legal system and its defects.  After the 1982 
Constitution went into effect and prior to the referendum of 2010, 157 the 
government was severely criticized as undemocratic.  Though amendments 
were made in 2010, the Constitution remains an impediment to Turkey’s 
accession to the EU because it fails to provide the rights it guarantees.  Even 
more undemocratic and controversial is the Turkish Penal Code, which 
infringes upon the rights of its citizens and gives the government great 
powers to suppress and punish those with whom it disagrees. 
First, Article 14 of the Turkish Constitution takes away what it provides 
in later articles.  It says, “[n]one of the rights and freedoms embodied in the 
Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible 
integrity of the state with its territory and nation, and endangering the 
existence of the democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic based 
upon human rights.”158  What this seems to mean is that although citizens 
have certain fundamental rights, they cannot be exercised if they threaten to 
violate Turkey’s integrity.  The second part of the provision presumes that 
inherent in Turkey’s integrity is democracy, secularism, and human rights 
protections.  Several modern examples demonstrate this is not the case.  
One is Turkey’s ban on certain political parties.159  Another is a law that 
makes it illegal to use any language other than Turkish in political life.160  
The government has used this law to prosecute violators.  For example, in 
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1991, Leyla Zana took her oath for Parliament in Kurdish.  She also dared 
“to speak Kurdish and wear the Kurdish colors in the ribbons in her 
headband in Parliament.”161  For this she spent 10 years in prison.162  The 
policy that no language other than Turkish may be used in political life still 
exists today.163  More recently, Turkey’s Parliament Speaker reminded a 
party chairman of this policy after a political party chairman “addressed 
party representatives in Kurdish for 10 minutes during [a] meeting.”164  
Although the chairman was not jailed, he was reminded that legal action 
would be taken against anyone who does not comply with the law.165   
Related to this is a nationwide policy that the Kurdish language cannot 
be taught in schools.  However, for the first time in the country’s history, a 
Turkish university “established the first Kurdish . . . language department[], 
and started to accept students to post-graduate programmes organised  by 
these departments.”166  Despite this one development, “Kurdish language 
training in public schools is, in fact, illegal.167 
The second controversial provision in Turkey’s constitution is Article 26, 
which says 
Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his thoughts and opinion 
by speech, in writing or in pictures or through other media, individually or 
collectively. . . .   
. . . . The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purposes of 
protecting national security, public order and public safety, the basic 
characteristics of the Republic and safeguarding the indivisible integrity of 
the State with its territory and nation . . . . 168 
The reason this provision is controversial is because, like many others, in 
practice it has proven to be false; citizens who have attempted to express 
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their thoughts in public have been punished.169  Despite its alleged 
protection in the Constitution, freedom of expression is lacking.170  While 
the 2010 Progress Report on Turkey indicated the media is enjoying greater 
freedoms than ever before, it also mentioned that a substantial number of 
lawsuits have been brought against journalists.171  There is “[u]ndue political 
[pressure] on the media,” which greatly hinders the exercise of freedom of 
the press.”172  An important illustration of this is the case of Hrant Dink,173 
which serves as an example of Turkey’s lack of freedom of expression as 
well as radical measures taken by its society for the purpose of denying the 
Armenian Genocide.174  Dink was an editor of an Armenian newspaper 
called Agos published in Turkey.  He was a human rights activist and 
debated “openly and critically issues of Armenian identity and official 
versions of history in Turkey relating to” the Armenian Genocide.175  Even 
after receiving death threats for his views, he continued to write until he was 
murdered.176  Before his death he was prosecuted three times for writing 
about the Genocide.  He was charged with insulting the Turkish identity 
under Section 301 of Turkey’s Penal Code 177 and was “handed a six-month 
suspended prison sentence.”178   
In 2010, the European Court of Human Rights issued a judgment holding 
that Turkey failed to protect Hrant Dink’s life.179  Specifically, the Court 
found that the Turkish government was in violation of Articles 2, 10, and 13 
of the Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés 
fondamentales.180  These articles are the right to life, freedom of expression, 
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and the right to an effective remedy, respectively.181  Accordingly, the Court 
ordered the Turkish government to pay Dink’s family 105,000 euros in 
compensation.182  Turkey’s response to this incident is somewhat surprising 
in that it said it would not appeal the Court’s judgment.  Immediately 
following the shooting, Turkey promised to bring those responsible for the 
murder to justice.  To be clear, there is no evidence that the government 
itself was responsible for Dink’s murder.  Nonetheless, the government was 
aware that Dink had received death threats and did nothing to protect him.183  
It is not for the act of murder that the EU reprimanded Turkey; rather it is 
for its failure to protect the journalist prior to the murder.184  It is also worth 
reiterating that the government prosecuted him for his expressions.   
B. Other Laws and Their Use Against the Kurds  
The Kurds are a large minority group in Turkey and comprise about 
eighteen percent of Turkey’s total population.185  The Kurds claim that 
Turkey’s Constitution discriminates against them186  and specifically point 
to Articles 3, 42, and 66.187  Article 3 provides “[t]he Turkish state, with its 
territory and nation, is an indivisible entity.  Its language is Turkish.”188  
Article 66 in relevant part provides, “[e]veryone bound to the Turkish state 
through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.  The Child of a Turkish father or a 
Turkish mother is a Turk.”189  Therefore, the Kurds argue that they are 
intentionally left out of the Constitution.190 
In response to the Turkish government leaving the Kurds powerless, the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was formed in 1984.191  It sought Kurdish 
independence and an independent Kurdish state.192  Since the PKK’s 
formation, the Turkish government has taken steps to restrain its 
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influence.193  Between 1984 and 1999, the Turkish military used its Anti-
Terror laws to suppress the PKK.  The Anti-Terror laws lay out the 
government’s emergency powers.  Article One of the Law to Fight 
Terrorism (Act No. 3713) defines terrorism: 
Terrorism is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an 
organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic 
as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and 
economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its 
territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and 
Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, 
eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and 
external security of the State, public order or general health by means of 
pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.  An 
organization for the purposes of this Law is constituted by two or more 
persons coming together for a common purpose.  The term “organization” 
also includes formations, associations, armed associations, gangs or armed 
gangs as described in the Turkish Penal Code and in the provisions of 
special laws.194 
From this definition, it appears that because the PKK desires an independent 
Kurdistan, its aim must be to change the characteristics of the Republic of 
Turkey.  It must logically follow that the PKK is a terrorist organization.   
Furthermore, under Article Eight of this Act, “written and oral 
propaganda and assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at 
damaging the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with[in] its territory 
and nation are forbidden, regardless of the methods, intentions and ideas 
behind such activities.”195  Under this Act, the government has closed pro-
Kurdish newspapers; banned political parties; and jailed politicians, 
journalists, and human rights activists.196  Moreover, in 2009 and 2010, 350 
children as young as 12 were characterized as terrorists by the government 
because they attended a demonstration organized by the PKK.197  They were 
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convicted under Act 3713, and serve in adult prisons. 198  Mere presence at 
such demonstrations renders these children PKK members.199  There is a 
presumption that all Kurdish protests are organized by the PKK.200 
Turkey is making progress with respect to applying this anti-terror law to 
children and prosecuting them as adults.  For example, in 2010 the 
legislature adopted the law for stone-throwing children, the purpose of 
which was to ease punishment for children charged under the Anti-Terror 
Laws. 201  
Another reform is the repeal of Articles 141 and 142 of its Penal Code 
(Act No. 765).202  The repeal came from Article 23 of the Law to Fight 
Terrorism Act.203  These two articles “banned any form of association or 
propaganda with the purpose of establishing communist, dictatorial or racist 
regimes.”204  In addition, Article 163 of the Penal Code was repealed.  This 
Article “banned any kind of association or propaganda with the aim of 
transforming Turkey’s basis social or political order in conformity with any 
religious principles and beliefs.”205  Moreover, controversial Article 301 of 
the Turkish Penal Code was amended in 2005.  Originally, Article 301 said:   
(1) Anyone who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall be punished with imprisonment 
of from six months to three years. 
(2) Anyone who publicly insults the Government of the Republic of 
Turkey, the judicial bodies of the state, the military or police shall be 
punished with imprisonment of from six months to two years. 
(3) Where a Turkish citizen denigrates Turkishness in a foreign country, 
the penalty shall be increased by one third. 
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(4) Expressions of opinion with the intention of criticism shall not incur 
punishment.206 
Following the amendment, Article 301 says:  
(1) A person who publicly denigrates Turkish Nation, the State of the 
Republic of Turkey, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the 
Government of the Republic of Turkey or the judicial bodies of the State, 
shall be sentenced a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months and 
two years. 
(2) A person who publicly denigrates the military or security structures 
shall be punishable according to the first paragraph. 
(3) Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a 
crime. 
(4) The prosecution under this article shall be subject to the approval of the 
Minister of Justice.207 
In effect, the new Article 301 reduced the term of imprisonment and 
eliminated the provision increasing the penalty by one third if denigration of 
“Turkishness” is carried out in a foreign country.  It appears that the 
government liberalized Article 301 to a certain extent.  Nevertheless, it still 
remains illegal to insult Turkey since both adults and children are being 
punished for expressing themselves through such democratic practices as 
demonstrations.   
1. Conclusion 
It is no easy task to reform an entire Constitution to align it with the 
policies of the EU.  There are major differences in philosophy, culture, and 
politics between the EU as a whole and Turkey as an individual nation.  
Aligning itself with the EU will require a transformation of principles that 
have historically guided Turkish life.  However, the aforementioned issues 
with Turkey’s legal policies require some flexibility on Turkey’s part.  
While it can be commended for its progress so far, it is doubtful that Turkey 
will be at a disadvantage if it simply agrees to recognize the Kurds, allows 
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them to exercise their traditions and speak their language.208  As with 
recognizing the Armenian Genocide, it will only bring Turkey closer to EU 
membership.   
IV. A COMPARISON WITH OTHER RECENTLY JOINED EU MEMBERS: 
BULGARIA AND ROMANIA  
In general, after eleven years of negotiations, Turkey has only aligned 
itself marginally with the EU, and has shown the greatest improvement in 
its economic development.209  While it can be argued that recently-joined 
EU member states were not in any better shape at the time of their accession 
than Turkey is today, a closer look shows that, in fact, they were.  While 
Turkey’s liberalized trading enables it to compete better with advanced 
nations, certain other factors, including its geographic location, political and 
judicial internal policies, as well as tense relations with its neighbors, are 
what were absent from Bulgaria and Romania.  It is important to bear in 
mind that decisions are made by representatives of countries that are 
similarly situated.210  Their decisions do not necessarily reflect what is best 
for the EU; they are based on the national interests of those who have power 
to effect policy.211  After all, intergovernmental organizations are only as 
strong as their strong member-states want them to be.212  While Romania 
and Bulgaria may be less economically-modernized than Turkey, they really 
were better candidates for EU membership than Turkey is today as 
evidenced by the EU trend of offering membership to countries that are 
predominantly Christian and share European philosophy and culture.      
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One important comparison point is the level of democracy in Turkey, 
Bulgaria, and Romania.  Of those three countries, only Turkey bans political 
parties.  Only in Turkey are there constitutional provisions that infringe 
upon the rights of minorities by explicitly denying them citizenship.  And 
only Turkey imprisons children because they attend demonstrations.  On a 
positive note, however, in all three nations there is a general presence of 1) 
a pluralistic government system; 2) fair elections, and 3) peaceful transfers 
of power.213   There are also similarities on the issue of minority protection:  
In both Bulgaria and Romania, there is a big problem relating to the 
treatment of the Roma population who does not receive equal protection 
from the governments.  In fact, since their accession, the Roma from both 
nations have been immigrating to Western Europe.214  Turkey’s treatment of 
the Kurds has also caught the Commission’s attention, which urges Turkey 
to provide the Kurds fundamental rights. 
With respect to individual freedoms, in 2005 the Commission identified 
Bulgaria’s freedom of expression situation as having improved.  Examples 
of this include the Bulgarian courts’ interpretation of “the law in a manner 
that favoured journalistic expression” and the absence of restrictions in the 
audio and visual media sector.215  Additionally, the Commission praised the 
Bulgarian government for its progress in the area of freedom of association.  
There was an increase in the number of non-governmental organizations 
operating in Bulgaria throughout the early 2000s.  This was also true in 
Romania.  On the issue of freedom of religion, in its 2004 Progress Report 
the Commission noted there were some issues relating to “procedural 
guidelines in the Law of Denominations” in Bulgaria, while the Romanian 
government actually did provide freedom of religion both through its 
Constitution and in practice.216  Additionally, the Commission pointed out 
that while there was some mistreatment on the part of law enforcement 
agents toward certain groups of people, including the Roma, children, 
homosexuals, and prisoners, “Romania aligned its legislation with European 
practice and standards.”217   
On the issue of human rights violations, both Bulgaria and Romania 
played a role in the Holocaust218 but both have recognized the Holocaust 
  
 213. TURKEY-EU RELATIONS, supra note 139, at 282.   
 214. The French government, however, has made their stay unwelcome.  There have 
been massive deportations of the Roma out of France. See France Faces Showdown on Roma 
at European Union Summit, BBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-11323053. 
 215. Bulgaria 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report, supra note 103, at 13. 
 216. 2004 Regular Report on Romania’s Progress Towards Accession, COM (2004) 
657 final (Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/ 
key_documents/2004/rr_ro_2004_en.pdf [hereinafter Romania 2004 Report]. 
 217. TURKEY-EU RELATIONS, supra note 139, at 290.   
 218. See generally Executive Summary:  Historical Findings and Recommendations, 
YAD VASHEM, http://www1.yadvashem.org/yv/en/about/events/pdf/report/english/ 
EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2011) (discussing the issue of 
 
146 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:1 
and claimed responsibility.  Turkey, in contrast, fails to recognize the 
Armenian genocide despite the existence of evidence that it did, in fact, take 
place.    
On the issue of transnational disputes, Turkey compares only to 
Romania:  There was a dispute between Romania and Ukraine involving 
Serpent Island and the Black Sea maritime boundary delimitation.219  In 
addition, “Romania . . . opposes Ukraine’s reopening of a navigation canal 
from the Danube border through Ukraine to the Black Sea.”220  Turkey’s 
transnational disputes involve Greece (over the Island of Cyprus and the 
Aegean Sea),221 Syria (over Turkish hydrological projects),222 Armenia (over 
the area of Nagorno-Karabakh),223 and Iraq (over Iraq’s support of the 
PKK).224  Bulgaria has no transnational disputes.225   
Some similarities are also found in the economic sectors.  The EU 
Commission found that Bulgaria and Romania suffered from economic 
fluctuations during the same time Turkey suffered from its economic 
crises.226  Ultimately, the Commission found their economic policies were 
on par with what the EU expected.227 
Another comparison point is the judicial systems of the three countries.  
It is true that both Bulgaria and Romania rank lower on the corruption scale 
than Turkey, but it is also true that there are widespread corruption practices 
in all three countries at all levels.  In Turkey, for example, the judicial 
branch lacks independence from political pressure, 228 reflected by the 
practice of judges reporting to the Ministry of Justice.  Prosecutors also 
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have close connections with judges and magistrates.  In Bulgaria’s case, the 
government was able to improve its judiciary, but the Commission urged it 
to better prosecute organized crime and corruption. 229  While corruption 
presented a major setback, the government was able to make significant 
progress by 2007.230  From 1998 to 2006, the Commission rated Romania’s 
progress in reforming the judiciary as insufficient; it was only in 2006 that 
the Commission noticed some progress in this area.231 
What is apparent from these comparisons is that each potential candidate 
has its own unique problems, but what can be concluded is that the 
problems specific to Bulgaria and Romania, even collectively, do not reach 
the number and significance of Turkey’s problems.  While Turkey is 
capable of aligning itself with the EU, if the EU is really delaying the 
process because it just does not want Turkey as a member, it will find ways 
to delay membership further.232  The problems presented in this paper do not 
address all problems the EU has found with Turkey and only scratch the 
surface of the major ones.    
CONCLUSION 
Turkey needs to be recognized for the reforms it has made so far.  These 
reforms did not come easy for Turkey, a nation that is less-European, both 
culturally and historically, than any EU member today.  The EU does not 
necessarily require a candidate-nation to “Europeanize” since there are no 
religious or cultural conditions.  Instead, what it requires is what every 
nation in the twenty-first century should already have respect for those 
living within its borders, respect for human rights, a stable economy, a 
functioning legal system, and at least passable relations with its neighbors.  
These are reasonable expectations.  What is unreasonable, however, is 
member-states using their voting and veto powers to serve their own 
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interests.  The EU’s mission is to promote peace, and with that aim in mind 
it should rationally decide whether Turkey has met the EU’s accession 
requirements.   
From Turkey’s perspective, it should weigh all the benefits of EU 
membership against the burdens of meeting the Copenhagen criteria.  But 
Turkey has not been fighting for admission for the past twenty-four years to 
just simply give up.  This shows that it is dedicated to its quest for 
admission.  The reality is, Turkey has quite a bit of domestic problems and 
transnational disputes to resolve, and has a ways to go until it reaches true 
democracy.  Until it does, the EU will be hesitant to move forward.  This 
article ends with the statement that most articles on this issue end: Turkey 
has a long road ahead.   
 
